Repeated interactions and the decrease of the informal sector
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37135/kai.03.07.04Keywords:
Teoría de juegos, dilema del prisionero, informalidadAbstract
Despite the fact that the formalization of productive activities generates positive externalities for the economic development of the countries, it is known that informality is a phenomenon that persists over time. As it is an activity in which government and productive agents interact, we study it from a theoretical approach of a game. We look at the sector from the perspective of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Also, we consider the benefits provided by formalization among our agents through their preferential rate with respect to time.
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