CHINA AND ITS INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA
CHINA Y SUS INTERESES EN AMÉRICA LATINA
Bryan J. Naranjo-Navas
1
Christian P. Naranjo-Navas
2
1 Universidad San Francisco de Quito (Ecuador). Correo electrónico: eldestinobryn@hotmail.com.
2 Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo (Ecuador). Correo electrónico: cnaranjo@unach.edu.ec.
Abstract
It is a reection article based on a bibliographic review. Its objective is to analyze the Chinese political and economic
interest in Latin America, especially, to examine Chinese investments in the strategic sectors in Venezuela, Brazil,
Argentina, and Ecuador. e article reaches three conclusions that help to understand this inuence: rst, the inuence
of China was possible by the political withdrawal of the governments of the United States; second, China’s growing need
to supply its raw material industries; and third, the generation of debtors that would be linked to China for many years,
in some cases, the payments were scheduled to nish in a couple of decades. Within these elements, China’s inuence
over the region has developed, increased, and strengthened.
Key Words
China, Latin America, Economy, Politics.
Resumen
Este es un artículo de reexión basado en una revisión bibliográca, y cuyo objetivo es analizar el interés político y
económico chino en América Latina, especialmente, examinar las inversiones chinas en los sectores estratégicos en
Venezuela, Brasil, Argentina y Ecuador. El artículo llega a tres conclusiones que ayudan a comprender esta inuencia:
primera, la inuencia de China fue posible por el retiro político de los gobiernos de los Estados Unidos; segunda, la
creciente necesidad de China de suministrar a sus industrias de materias primas; y, tercera, la generación de deudores
que estarían vinculados a China por muchos años, en algunos casos, los pagos se programaron para nalizar en un par
de décadas. Dentro de estos elementos, la inuencia china sobre la región se ha desarrollado, aumentado y fortalecido.
Palabras clave
China, América Latina, Economía, Política.
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE CHIMBORAZO
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
Vol. 3 (2020), No. 5, Segundo Semestre (Julio - Diciembre), (62-75)
ISSN No. 2631-2743
Recibido de 6 febrero de 2020; Aceptado 12 de mayo de 2020
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
63
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
Introduction
e last decades of the twentieth century did not bring
the announced prosperity by the democratic discourse
of the west. e multiple political and economic crises
opened the doors to consider other types of governance.
It is understood that from the beginning of the twentieth
century, a new political movement became very popular
in Latin America. is movement was called Socialism
of the XXI Century. ese movements arrived in power
through political elections.
Nonetheless, once in power, most of new presidents
organized national assemblies to construct new
constitutions. ese new macro-legal systems provided
the presidents with extensive power to inuence the
judiciary and parliamentary power. While at the same
time, built strong control organizations and methods
over the press and private businesses. e new socialist
movements made use of elections to justify the changes
that occurred in the rest of the political and economic
structure.
At the same time, China had become one of the
superpowers of the world. is phenomenon started
in the decade of the seventies. Before that, China
experienced one of the biggest catastrophes of the
twentieth century, thanks to poverty and starvation,
which were caused by a very controlled and centralized
economy. Since the changing of direction in 1979, China
became a free-market-oriented economy, with an annual
growth average of 9.5% in the last four decades, becoming
one of the fastest-growing economies (Morrison, 2018).
is growth rate made it possible to duplicate the Gross
Domestic Product, GDP, every decade and led 800 million
people out of poverty.
In recent decades, China’s inuence on the development
of the world’s economy has not stopped growing and
been accentuated even more aer the nancial crisis
of the world in 2008. Aer 2008, China has entered
with a peculiar strength into negotiations with the
developing nations of the world. Especially with the Latin
American countries which have faced the increment of
oil prices, many countries from South America entered
into external debt to pay the rise of public expenditure,
expecting oil prices to stay high for a long time. While
in 2000, the Asian giant represented about 3.6% of world
GDP, in 2016, its share amounted to 15% (Villafañe,
2016). By 2016, China was already the largest industrial
and agricultural producer in the world.
e growth of a new superpower found a big need for raw
materials that were to be found around the world. In this
sense, China found a necessity to combine its growth with
strategic associations. e bilateral association, thanks
to the tremendous Chinese demand for raw materials,
which triggered the international prices, was the main
factor in the region’s growth. Latin America encountered
a potent partner. China was open to paying high prices
for raw material from the region to get in return the
availability of building and managing the most important
infrastructure, mining, oil, and electric businesses.
e talks among the Latin American and China leaders
included some political and economic aspects of mutual
interests, especially the negotiations of the handling of
the strategic segments. When the raw material touched
its price pick in 2014, the promptness of the negotiations
with China slowed down as the governmental budget
of the developing countries went through a prolonged
stagnation; the worth of the commercial exchange
between Latin America and China reduced for three
consecutive years. However, in 2017 the price of Latin
American exports increased to 25% (Ray and Gallagher,
2015), aer a slight fall, it continued rising until 2018
(Index Mundi, 2019). e same source shows that the
index of fuel commodities grew 46 points from February
2016 to October 2018. While the metal price index grew
30 points in the same period, the food price index only
grew 10 points, and the agricultural raw material grew 3
points. Aer 2017, the prices of raw material recovered as
a partnership with the developing nations. Nonetheless,
the partnership was not the same as before, as the political
scene of the Latin American countries started questioning
the benets and costs of the partnership with China.
Despite the strong growth driven by the increase in
oil and certain raw materials prices, the commercial
exchange with China is still in a severe growing tendency.
According to the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, 10% of the region’s
exports of goods in 2017 were destined for China, while
19% of imports came from there (Villavicencio, 2013). It
is predicted that in less than a decade, the Asian country
will displace the European Union as the second-largest
buyer of Latin American products behind the United
States, which in 2010 had already yielded the rst place as
the main exporter to Latin America.
e Chinese phenomenon happened at the same time as
the United States, before completing the second year of
Trump administration in the White House, decided to
start a commercial battle by imposing import taris on
Chinese products. e US Government decided to retreat
from the international agreements, questioning alliances
and breaking treaties. In Latin America, China became an
important political and economic partner of the region.
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
64
With the Socialism of the XXI century movements, it
had not only economic interests in Latin America, but
also political interests. e Asian tiger found the perfect
political context to spread its political, cultural, and
social power and to ll the space that the US le with the
governments. e withdrawal from the region began with
Obama’s government, which allowed the region’s socialist
government to develop. Aer Obama, Trump established
his devotion to the anti-globalization program of “First
America”; nonetheless, the new US president rapidly
got involved in the Venezuela crisis and the support to
the new right-wing governments in Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia.
Given the relative increase in China’s investment and
inuence and the decreasing inuence of the United
States, the Latin American countries have encountered the
need to revise the consequences of these commercial and
political relationships, in order to make better decisions.
In this sense, this article analyses recent research results
of China’s interests in Latin America, from a political
and economic perspective. is reection article, which
bases its conclusions in a bibliographic revision, intends
to analyze the Chinese political and economic interest in
Latina America, whose main purpose is to focus on the
Chinese investment in the strategic sectors in Venezuela,
Brazil, and Argentina, and Ecuador.
Political and economic context
In the last decades, China’s inuence on the development
of the world economy has not stopped growing. It has
been accentuated in the last decades, especially with
the arrival of some leist Latin America leaders, such
as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Lula da Silva in Brazil,
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
in Argentina, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. is new
political movement created the image of the enemy
incarnated in the United States, and in any political
link that could be tracked to the hegemon. At the same
time, the government of Barack Obama started a policy
of no intervention: the no intervention built the perfect
political context through which China entered as the new
ally of the region.
e policy of no intervention continued rhetorically
within the campaign of Donald Trump; however,
once in power, the U.S. tried to regain the lost political
and economic space with political candidates and
new presidents that eventually replaced the socialist
government structures. Leaders such as Mauricio Macri
in Argentina, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Sebastian
Piñera in Chile and there was an endless diplomatic
and economic campaign to get Nicolas Maduro out of
the autocratic Venezuelan regime. e United States
Government faced contradictory rhetoric of protecting
the national boundaries and retreating from the
international commercial agreements and, at the same
time, trying to recover the political space lost during the
Obama administration.
In Latin America, China, which has been an important
trading partner for more than two decades, increased
its political, cultural, and social inuence to ll the gap
created by the lack of a U.S. diplomatic strategy. In less
than a year, the U.S. president had conrmed his loyalty
to his anti-globalization agenda of “First America.”
Trump has withdrawn the U.S. from the Trans-Pacic
Partnership (TPP) with Asian and Latin American
countries and the Paris Agreement, to which all the
nations of the world are subscribed. e U.S. President
threatened to end the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
with Mexico and Canada, obligating these countries to
sign a new agreement. e United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA) in which the protection for U.S.
intellectual property, digital trade, anticorruption, food,
and agriculture trade is emphasized (Oce of the United
States Trade Representative, 2019). is agreement was a
political victory for the Trump administration, which in
rhetoric kept the slogan of “America First”, but in practice,
it tried to recover a new inuence in the international
arena. “I will always put America rst; we cannot continue
participating in agreements in which the United States
does not get anything good” (NBC News, 2017), said the
Republican president at the U.N. General Assembly.
During the government of Barack Obama, the XXI
Century Socialism found some strategic partners in
Russia and China. From both countries, the main
association was built with Chinese investments in the
region. is investment was viable in some strategic
sectors, such as oil, mining, and electricity. Aer China
lent millions of dollars in debt, forcing the Latin American
governments to enter into the debt-trap diplomacy,
which is a way of saddling countries with high-interest
debt that they are unable to repay, giving China leverage
over the borrowing countries (Dollar, 2019). e purpose
was to lend money to developing countries to construct
infrastructure in transport, power, water supply, and
other sectors, in 2017. President Xi Jinping noted that
China needs to seize opportunities presented by the new
round of change in the energy mix and the revolution of
energy technologies to develop global interconnection,
achieve green and low-carbon development, improve
trans-regional logistics network, promote connectivity
of policies, rules, and standards to provide institutional
safeguards for enhancing connectivity (Xinhua, 2017).
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
65
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
According to Gallagher and Myers (2020), from the Inter-
American Dialogue, Latin America has 84 loans from
China, amounted to a total of USD 137 billion. From the
total, there are 34 loans for energy (USD 91,9 billion), 34
for infrastructure (USD 26,8 billion), 3 for mining (USD
2,1 billion), and 23 for other types of investments like
government bonds, trade nancing, home construction
and nancing funds in Venezuela, satellite development
in Bolivia and business development in Uruguay (USD
16,2 billion). In Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, China
signed quasi-collateralized loans with the option to pay
in oil.
Some of these loans have been used to nance debt. is
massive amount of loans creates the threat of falling
into the debt-trap, which can be unfolded through the
administration of strategic sectors such as energy or the
repayment in oil or mining material. e risk of falling
into the debt-trap is more real, considering that the oil
prices collapsed in 2020, registering negative prices in
April. e fall of oil prices has been constant from 2013,
from USD 90 per barrel (2010=100) to USD 54 in 2019
(e World Bank, 2020). For oil producers such as Brazil,
Venezuela, and Ecuador, the little income from the oil
revenues could ensure the trespassing of the strategic
sector administration to the Chinese companies.
Despite the large number of resources coming from
China, capitals were not invested in making the economy
sustainable, so that the revolutionary movements’
apparent rhetoric could be real. Vilar (2018) believes
that the economic resources that came from China
from the commerce of raw materials were wasted in
the propaganda of the governments, rather than in the
creation of an essential emerging middle class that would
ensure, its consumption, and the economic mobility of
their countries.
According to Vidal Molina (2019), aer the economic
crisis of 2008, a critical development began to expand,
both from academic, political-institutional, and social
movements, to nd a solution to the new problems that
the world and, especially, the Latin American region were
facing. Before this crisis, since the end of the 1990s and in
the early 2000s, social processes in some Latin American
countries showed signs of a critical situation based on the
implementation of neoliberal policies. ese signs gave
space for the rebuilding of a new political hegemony that
was encompassed around the idea of new socialism. e
elected leaders of this new socialist movement found
strategic partners in nations with a socialistic historical
background such as China and Russia.
e nancial crisis of the world opened the eyes of the
region to a new important partnership in powerful
nations. While in the year 2000, the Asian giant
represented about 3.6% of world GDP, in 2016, its share
amounted to 15%. China was already the largest industrial
and agricultural producer in the world. e bilateral
agreements that were signed, thanks to the great Chinese
demand for raw materials that triggered the rise of prices,
were the main factors of growth for the region. According
to López Villafañe (2016), the Chinese model has been
based fundamentally on cheap labor, which represented
two economic problems, at least for this country. For a
large majority of Chinese workers, their labor is still
cheap; that is, their wages have not increased at the same
rate as prices. It leads to the problem of China’s future
economic sustainability. e other problem arises in the
objective of industrial and technological; nonetheless,
the instruments for this massive change are in the hands
of the Chinese companies, which remain competitive
in the old, low-qualied branches characterized by
low innovation and technological development. is
situation could change with the Made in China 2025
plan, which tries to develop rapidly articial intelligence,
communications, air navigation, robotics, biotechnology,
electronics, among others.
Ray and Gallagher (2015), in their annual China-Latin
America bulletin, analyzed the China greeneld projects,
the larger one was the Nicaragua Canal, larger than all
other Chinese greeneld FDI projects for the last ve years
combined. Even though the planned canal never started,
Ray and Gallagher also mentioned that China registered
17% of new greeneld projects in Latin America, more
than any other year. During the rst decades of the
twentieth century, the Chinese investment focused on
extraction projects with the oil and gas sector accounting
for 69% of Chinese investment between 2009 and 2013.
Aer this glorious commercial relation, during the
reduction of oil prices in 2013, the economy of the
developing countries stopped its growth. e value of
the commercial exchange between Latin America and
China was reduced for three consecutive years. However,
in 2017 the value of Latin American exports increased
strongly to 25%, approaching the highest level reached
in 2013 (Ray and Gallagher, 2015). e commercial
relations between Latin America and China would not
be the same since the region’s political environment had
changed: many of the socialist leaders of the region were
changed democratically. Although the Chinese inuenced
diminished since 2017, its investments over the last
two decades were so profound that, aer the COV19
crisis, the partnership will continue with new possible
outcomes as some countries might decide to sell or cede
the administration of their emblematic investments.
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
66
With the arrival of new Latin American governments,
which made clear dierences with the socialist movements
of the rst decade of the twentieth century, the agreements
with China became a critical aspect of the local politics. e
agreements were made within a capsule of hermeticism;
however, some journalists had few courageous eorts to
visualize some of the axes of the commercial agreements
with China. Fernando Villavicencio (2013) published
a comprehensive book on the political and economic
repercussions of the commercial agreements between
Ecuador and China. Villavicencio stated that the heart
of the Ecuadorian model was the return to an expanded
extractive mechanism of development that combines
oil exploitation, mining exploitation, global toll, export
agriculture, biofuel, environmental services, and the
excessive growth of speculation in various sectors of the
economy.
According to Villavicencio, several of the commercial
agreements with China were linked to the payment of oil
credits (prepayments), around USD 3 billion, with interest
ranging between 6% and 7.25% per annum. Besides, they
served as collateral, cover, and down payment for other
credits, such as the USD 2 billion agreed in 2011. In total,
the commitments with Petrochina added up to more than
421 million barrels of oil in long-term contracts.
Despite the change of the local political scenario, China’s
inuence in the region continues. According to ECLAC
data, 10% of the region’s exports of goods go to China,
while in 2017, 19% of imports came from the Asian
country (Villavivencio, 2013). In this way, soon, China
will displace the European Union as the second-largest
buyer of Latin American products behind the United
States, which in 2010 had already yielded the rst place as
the main exporter to Latin America. In absolute values,
commercial relations show that China already displaced
the European Union. It did not happen with the U.S.,
which remains the rst regional commercial partner,
showing that the U.S. retreat from the region was more a
political than an economic one.
China’s inuence in regional politics
China has shown that it has a well-dened long-term
strategy of where it wants to go and what it expects
from Latin America. On the other side, Latin America
never showed a clear political strategy more than follow
the political rhetoric against imperialism. From the
beginning of the socialist Latin American governments,
the partnership with China arose as a natural link which
unfolded in trade, assistance, and cooperation in energy
endeavors, used diplomatic approaches to support the
Latin American political discourse, and sought natural
resources as payments of investments. In sum, Latin
America provided a big portion of raw materials and
money for the growth of China.
Lafargue & Lafargue (2017) remarks that China had no
interest in Latin America during most of the twentieth
century due to the overwhelming presence of the United
States in the region. Nonetheless, from the beginning of
the twenty-rst century, this passivity changed, beginning
with a growing presence in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.
China’s investments have pushed away from the United
States’ diminishing inuence, considering the withdrawal
of the governments of Barack Obama. Although China’s
inuence over the region is undeniable, it has proven to
be an untrustworthy partner. In fact, China did not doubt
to vote against Brazil when the later tried to ensure a U.N.
Security Council seat in 2018.
Domínguez Martín (2017) has argued extensively
that China’s inuence over Latin America politics is
a cornerstone of preoccupation for the United States
because its image has been changing in the region, from
a powerful partner to an authoritative, hegemonic, all-
powerful evil. While the image of the United States is
negative, the image of China has remained neutral, with
few spots of political discourses against the Asian power,
but, overall, with a hidden image. ese variants have
restructured the political game having the United States
as the all-powerful, authoritative, hegemonic evil partner
on one side, and China, very distant to be important,
as the neutral partner on the other side. is important
aspect of the region’s international relations is especially
evident with Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and
Brazil. Although the problem of a decreasing political
relationship among the United States and Latin America
is real, Domínguez Martín thinks that it is doubtful that
the U.S. inuence will degrade more in the next years.
Similar studies have been done by Johnson (2017), who
has argued that the U.S. government’s underestimation
of the Chinese inuence has opened the door to worry
since the U.S. image in the region has deteriorated rapidly
in the last decades. President Trump’s administration
released the National Security Strategy in 2017, stating
that China expanded its power at the expense of the
sovereignty of other countries while seeking to displace
the United States in the Indo-Pacic region, expanding
the programs on a state-driven economic model. e
national security strategy comes as a response to the
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
(Xinhua, 2016) which stated the goal of establishing a
comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring
equality, mutual benet and common development
with Latin American and Caribbean countries while
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
67
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
supporting the ideological political forums such as the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States,
CELAC. e White House of Donald Trump initiated a
discourse that blamed socialism for the devastation of
countries such as Venezuela and Cuba.
Some scholars used the term Beijing Consensus to refer
to several fundamental features within of the economic-
political relation for development. e rst feature was
based on a constant commitment to innovation and
experimentation. e second feature was the non-xation
of per capita GDP growth as the ultimate goal of the
development model, but the promotion of a sustainable
and equal development model. With this image, China
has been seen as a mixture of a threat and a blessing in the
region. On the one hand, it has increased imports of raw
materials, causing bilateral trade balances with surpluses
in economies such as Chile and Peru, a surplus that has
been accentuated by the increase in the price level of
minerals during the twentieth-rst century. For instance,
the price of the metric ton of copper rose rapidly from
the 1998 crisis, from USD 1572 to USD 8828 in 2011 (e
World Bank, 2020). e copper price fall was not similar
to oil; the average copper price remained stable at around
USD 6000 until 2019.
Although China did not oer a clear discourse in support
of Latin America’s socialist governments during their
time in power, aer the new model of governance came
to the region, China’s ocials stated repeated letters
in support of the remaining socialist governments,
especially to Venezuela. In 2015, CELAC, an organization
made up of 33 American countries, rejected the rst
sanctions, joining the Group of 77 + China, which issued
a similar statement. In 2017, China joined those who
condemn U.S. warmongering rhetoric against Venezuela,
reminding President Trump of the principle of non-
interference in other countries, “all countries should
conduct their bilateral relations based on equality, mutual
respect, and non-interference in each other’s internal
aairs.” (HispanTv, 2017) In 2019, China supported the
Venezuelan government’s eorts to maintain sovereignty,
independence, and national stability (Tamara, 2019). In
2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua
Chunying reiterated China’s support for the independence
and sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
against the intention of changing the government of
Maduro by a democratic president. Hua Chunying stated
that “Venezuela is an independent and sovereign State,
China has constantly opposed the violation of Venezuela’s
sovereignty and any external interference in the country’s
internal aairs, we also oppose the illegal unilateral
sanctions.” (TeleSur, 2020).
China has been more politically active in the region.
However, Latin America is not a priority for China, since
it is located in a less important place than the United
States, Asia, or Europe (Cornejo & Navarro, 2010). From
a political point of view, Latin America is essential for
China in a diplomatic dispute with Taiwan. Aer decades
of hostility, relations between China and Taiwan started
improving from the 1980s. e Chinese proposal of
unication was rejected, even the plan known as “one
country, two systems,” in which Taiwan would be given
signicant autonomy if it accepted Chinese reunication
(BBC News, 2019). In 2018, China pressured international
companies to enlist Taiwan as a part of China, threatening
to block any doing relations.
ere is disagreement on how to consider Taiwan since
it has its own constitution with democratically elected
leaders and about 300,000 active troops. China’s political
inuence in the region has a strong arm in the economic
ties with Latin America. Blanchard (2019) has argued that
the growing economic dependence of Latin American
economies has come hand in hand with the extensive
political inuence of the Asian tiger in the region. e
author believes China is not only looking for its economic
development but also its political inuence in a region
dominated by the United States. e political ties come
along with the economic one having in mind that China
is playing an important role in Latin America for their
own political and economic reasons: the intention of
setting aside the U.S. inuence; the political pressure to
not recognize Taiwan or the Tibet as independent regions;
and, the assurance of the ow and administration of raw
materials from Latin America.
China impact of Latin America
economies
Gallagher K. (2016) has researched the impact of China in
Latin America, arming that the main element between
both partners is trading, in fact, China has become the
main export destination for countries such as Brazil,
Chile, and Peru, and has become the second country of
export destination for Argentina, Costa Rica, and Cuba.
is fact has engaged China with the regional decision-
making process that has produced many bilateral
agreements.
China has ensured the supply of raw materials for the
next decade. is type of strategy came through the hand
of debt; the Latin American countries got into increasing
amounts of debt, much of which will be paid through
the exports of raw materials, primarily through the
commerce of oil. e bilateral commercial relations have
been contextualized within the trade of commodities
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
68
and, in return, the availability of debt or investments. Gil
Barragán & Aguilera Castillo (2017) believe that China
has played a double role in the region. On one side, China
has become the most important commercial partner by
incrementing foreign direct investment; on the other side,
China has become a competitor to the manufacturing
areas. is type of commercial relationships have
structured the outcomes in four possible ways: rst, the
Chinese demand of raw materials has created a weak
position for Latin America due to price uctuations;
second, the Chinese investments have pushed countries
to a mutation of production; third, the manufacturing
sector of the region is on risk due to the competitive
Chinese sectors that have been implemented in oil and
mine industries; fourth, China has a growing market
share on the manufacturing sector, aecting the exports
of the Latin American countries.
Johnson (2017) mentions that the chain benets from
the continued movement of natural resources from Latin
America to China propose a big challenge for the U.S.
economic inuence in the region. While the U.S. gures
out a proper way to create an international image, China’s
inuence has created a growing dependency in Latin
America: a good part of the living standards of the region
depends on the inow of economic resources from China.
Likewise, Hiratuka (2018) arms that, during the rst
decade of the twenty-rst century, the Chinese economic
ows are remarkable in foreign direct investment,
nancing ows, and infrastructure projects. ese factors
propose a new platform that is more important than
trade alone, “post-crisis changes have caused the growth
rate of exports to decrease due to the fall in commodity
prices and the slowdown in the Chinese economy’s
growth. However, the accumulation of idle capacity and
the stagnation of world demand mean that imports from
China continued to increase to be only interrupted by the
sharp slowdown in LA economies more recently” (2018:
20).
e ties between China and Latin America has two faces
which have developed two challenges, one for the region
and one for the United States. e challenge for the region
is clear when we consider the topic of dependency and the
region’s challenge to face a growing dependency on China
in three areas: trade, infrastructure, and foreign direct
investment. is dependency became clear in the 2020
economic crisis. On the other hand, the U.S. challenge
shows the impossibility of a clear strategy towards the
Latin America region when the socialist movements are
very active: the general strikes in Latin America at the
end of 2019 showed the political and logistic power of
some socialist groups. ese challenges propose a new
scenario of the region’s future and its coming political and
economic tests.
Also, as seen in gure 1, Perroti (2015) states that the
Chinese demand for Latin American primary products
has emanated from its industrialization process, in which
metals have played a preponderant role. e dynamism of
this process has not only led to increases in the quantities
demanded but has also caused signicant upward
pressure on the prices of primary and mineral goods,
which translated into a substantial improvement in terms
of trade in many Latin American countries. According
to the work of Jenkins (2011), the “Chinese eect” on
world demand has had an impact on minerals and metals
because China has reached an income level in the use of
metals in relation to GDP. It has been a consequence of
the country’s rapid industrialization process. e demand
for metals has also been boosted by construction and
other infrastructure projects.
Figure 1. e impact of the Chinese demand on world prices, in
percentages, 2007
Source: Perroti, 2015, p. 50.
China is leading the primary sector consumption as a
generator of manufacturing, which is mixed with the
added value and technological improvements. ere
have also been signicant advances in the service sector
in which the Asian country has increased its eciency,
especially in the services related to trading (transport,
physical infrastructure, communications, business, and
professional services, including nancial services).
e role of this economy as a global consumer is also
substantive: China buys 53% of foreign sales of soybeans,
28% of soybean oil, and 23% of cotton while occupying
the rst place as a global consumer of coal, tin, zinc,
and copper (Perroti, 2015). Concerning the latter, its
participation in the world consumption of minerals and
metals was around 40% in 2009 in lead, nickel, tin, zinc,
primary steel, rened copper, and aluminum. at same
year, it consumed 10% of crude oil worldwide.
0
20
40
10,8
60
80
100
120
140
160
49,1
45,5
59,1
5,1
96
27,1
153,6
72,8
147,6
7,7
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
69
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
China’s investment in Latin America
According to Ortiz (2017), since 2010, the average ow
of foreign direct investment to the region has been close
to USD 172,000 million. Twice the average ow received
between 2001-2009, but with an accumulated fall of 26.6%
between 2011 and 2016. In this context, the estimated
Chinese foreign direct investment went from an average
annual amount of USD 1,357 million between 2001-2009
to USD 10,817 million in 2010-2016. e Chinese foreign
direct investment reached its third-highest level in 2016.
During 2001-2016, Chinese companies made 274
transactions with the region’s countries, with an
accumulated ow of USD 87,928 million. e estimated
employment associated with the investments was 202
thousand jobs. (Ortiz, 2017: 10). e period 2010-2016
witnessed the maximum dynamism for the moment,
accumulating almost USD 76,000 million and 168,806
jobs. However, 7 out of 10 transactions were linked
to capital increase processes during 2001-2016. New
investments accounted for only 36.46% of the FDI
and 49.85% of employment. In contrast, mergers and
acquisitions presented an average amount per transaction
ve times higher than that reported by new investments
and accounted for more than two-thirds of total Chinese
G DP.
e data presented in this section will present and analyze
the China’s investments in four countries: Venezuela,
Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador. ese countries have
received most of the China investments if we consider
only the Latin America region. e total amount of
investments in these countries sum up a total of USD
126.6 billion from 2007 to 2019 in ten years, China has
become the main investment partner and has become
the central lender, with a total of 55 loans (Gallagher &
Myers,2020). According to the same database, the last
years only registered four new loans due to the little
income these countries had within the crisis produced by
the fall of the commodities prices.
Venezuela
e government of Hugo Chavez tried to avoid any
investment in contact with the United States. He
considered the reincarnation of the devil and tried to
foster deeper relationships with other governments
such as the government of Russia, China, and others.
Since 2007, as seen in gure 2, China has increased its
investments in Venezuela, especially in two sectors: energy
and infrastructure, allocating China as the main regional
player that was looking for a bigger political inuence in
the region, especially for international topics that involve
China, such as the independence of the region of Tibet.
With the increment of China’s inuence, Venezuela
lost independence and political autonomy giving the
increasing amount of debt that was being acquired. Some
academics calculate the external debt in USD 246 million
(Trading Economics, 2019). e China investments in
Venezuela has opened the door to under-the-table deals
that have taken the political structure to high levels of
corruption. According to the Venezuelan attorney general
Tarek William Saab, Venezuela has lost USD 15 billion
due to corruption (Sputnik Mundo, 2018).
China’s economic investment in the region focuses on
access to raw materials, making Latin America dependent
on the external market. China’s particular management
of foreign policy to carry out a pragmatic diplomatic
agenda, especially in developing countries that have
essential resources, especially energy. e bilateral
agreements with Venezuela cover areas such as energy,
infrastructure, agriculture, technology (Rosales, Pérez,
Prado, & Bárcena, 2015). In 2019, aer two decades of
socialism, Venezuela had become a high-risk country for
investments, including China’s investments: the only way
China would keep on introducing money to Venezuela
is based on the acquirement of a stable source of oil and
mining elements.
Figure 2. Chinese investments in Venezuela, millions of USD
Source: appendix 1.
Brazil
Brazil is probably the main actors in the region,
considering it as the main political actor, and one of
the top economic actors. China’s investments in Brazil
coincide with Venezuela’s investments: this element is
understandable given the fact that socialist governments
were leading Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador.
e government of Lula da Silva opened the doors to the
strong inuence and dependence on China’s investments;
4000
5500
21400
5500
4500
10091
4000
5000
2200
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
70
nonetheless, the country’s industrial apparatus was not
under percussion, as it was in Venezuela. Although
the country’s industrial apparatus had to withhold the
pressure of higher taxes and labor rights, it could keep on
with the production levels.
As seen in gure 3, Brazil has received a total investment
of USD 28.9 billion from 2007 to 2019. e China
investments in Brazil coincided with the instability of the
Brazilian economy, from the beginning of the century,
Brazil’s economic growth oscillated between growth and
recession. In the last decades, the only period that Brazil
could consider some economic growth was from 2002 to
2008, given the high levels of the prices of oil. e average
annual growth of Brazil was 4.8%, combined with an
ination of 6% between 2004 and 2008 (Remes Lenicov,
Viola, & Knoll, 2015: 3). By 2019, Brazil is facing the
dicult situation of balancing its nances while dancing
with the political spectrum’s extremes.
Figure 3. Chinese investments in Brazil, millions of USD
Source: appendix 2.
Argentina
Argentina is considered a country that received a great
inuence from the European migration during the last
century, especially in the period between the World Wars.
Argentina has had a long tradition of coming close to
developed nations’ standards and falling far away from
these nations. In the former case, the presidency of Carlos
Menem is rememberable of the latter case; it is clear the
case of Juan Domingo Peron. Since the beginning of the
new century, Argentina fell apart from the developed
countries during the presidency of Nestor and Cristina
Kirchner. From 2003 to 2015, China’s investments were
welcomed in the nation as a way out of imperial countries’
inuence.
According to Remes Lenicov, Viola, & Knoll (2015),
Brazil is the rst destination of Argentine exports and
China, the third, aer the European Union (EU). As seen
in gure 4, China’s investments in Argentina amount a
total of 17.1 USD billion. During 2010-2015 foreign
direct investment from China tripled, with a progressive
diversication of investment projects towards the primary
sector, especially energy, oil, and gas (15%), as well as
mining (19%), and agriculture (4%), which together
account for 38% of the total (Oviedo, 2017: 101). Aer
the government of Mauricio Macri, with the return to the
socialist government of Alberto Fernandez, Argentina is
facing the recovering of high levels of external debt, and
high levels of social expenditures that are not supported
in a coherent scal balance.
Figure 4. Chinese investments in Argentina, millions of USD
Source: appendix 3.
Ecuador
Ecuador came from a decade of a convulsionary political
situation before the rise to power of Rafael Correa. ree
presidents were overthrown in less than ten years. It
prepared the context for a candidate’s arrival that would
blame all the evils of the country to the hegemon and
businessmen’s inuence. Rafael Correa came to power
with a very leist discourse, which led the country
away from the U.S. investments, in fact, away from any
signicant international investment until 2013, when the
size of the state needed a growing amount of nances.
e image of China arrived as the perfect commercial
partner.
e arrival of China to the country opened the door
to high levels of corruption, which is not unique to the
country, but part of the regular pattern among the Latin
American countries driven by the XXI century socialism.
In the political discourse, the China investments came
to change the industrial model of the nation, with very
costly publicity campaigns that foster the idea of a new
nation, with new energy sources to export it to the
neighboring countries. China’s investments served as a
political platform to embellish the greatness of the social
revolution.
750
356
3000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
7000
7500
5000
5300
2007 2008 2009 2014 2015 2016 2017
2007 2010 2012 2014 2017 2018 2019
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
30
4600
200
481
1100
236
10303
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
71
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
According to Luzuriaga (2017), in the context of dicult
nancing for Latin America, China consolidated itself as a
strategic partner of Ecuador through loans with extremely
lax conditions. is relation was appropriate for China’s
political and economic inuence in the region since it
allowed it to secure the necessary natural resources to
position its companies on the geo-economics board. As
seen in gure 5, China’s investment in Ecuador amounts
to a total of 18.4 USD billion, which congures China as
the main creditor partner of the nation.
Figure 5. Chinese investments in Ecuador, millions of USD
Source: appendix 4.
In the last two decades, China has passed from being a
small political and economic partner of the region to be
the main important one. is change of the role of China
in the region has to do with two critical factors: rst, the
withdrawal of the U.S. as the main political inuencer of
the region during the governments of Barack Obama;
second, the delivered intention of China to nd sources
of raw materials. e rst element was visible during
the governments of Barack Obama, who did very little
to stop the increasing growth of socialism in the region
and to stop the increasing inow of China’s investments.
About the second point, China has played a brilliant role
in oering the countries of the region large amounts of
money with the condition of having the monopoly of
areas such as mining, oil, and energy. With this panorama,
and considering the 2020 crisis, it is likely to see China
taking the administrative control of its investments in
Latin America.
e China growing and bulging export of capital to
Latin America since the 2000s, which has taken the
form of infrastructure projects, nancing, and foreign
direct investment, has motivated a growing interest in
the academic sector to understand their motivations,
behavior, and socioeconomic and environmental
repercussions. e region has also gained weight as
China’s trading partner. In 2000, they absorbed 3% of
China’s exports of goods and was the origin of 2% of its
imports. While in 2013, its share in both ows amounted
to 6% and 7%, respectively. Also, around 13% of imported
oil to China comes from Venezuela and Brazil. (Ríos,
2019). Despite this evolution, compared to other regions,
Latin America and the Caribbean is not among the most
important trading partners for China.
e bilateral trades, spurred by China’s massive demand
for raw materials, boosted prices, becoming the main
growth factor for the region. In 2014, the economy of
developing countries cooled down, and the exchange
value of the region with China fell for three consecutive
years. In 2017, it expanded again with signicant growth,
approaching the historical maximum reached in 2013;
nonetheless, 2019 and 2020 paved the road to a very
critical economic situation.
e countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are
sources of natural resources and commodities in the
global exchange. Chinese exports concentrated in Asia
(50%), the U.S. (20%), and Europe (19%), while the
entire region represents around 6% of the total world
merchandise trade. Latin America, Africa, and Oceania
account for 11%. Regarding China imports, 57%
corresponds to Asia, 18% to Europe, 10% to the U.S.,
and 15% to Latin America, Africa, and Oceania. 68% of
Chinese investments were carried out in Asia, 13% in the
U.S. and Europe, 12% in Latin America, 4% in Africa, and
3% in Oceania.
Conclusions
e Chinese model has been based fundamentally on
cheap labor, creating two economic problems. e work
of the Chinese workers is still cheap; that is, their wages
have not increased enough, leading to the problem of
model sustainability. Some Chinese economists call it
the trap of low- and moderate-income countries, which
will make it dicult for China to move to the status of
a developed country. It will also limit the potential of
the domestic market in the long term. Incorporating the
enormous labor reserve year aer year with low wages
will permanently put China in the condition of being an
economy of low labor cost indenitely.
On the other hand, for a long time, China’s position as a
pivotal partner to Latin America has been underestimated,
mostly limiting it to a growing and signicant role in
trade and investment but underestimating its political
role. e accelerated path of the preceding years was
complemented by the signing of widespread strategic
partnership agreements with the socialist governments of
3271
2000 2000
392
509
7050
2198
969
2010
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
72
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
Latin America is part of China’s future objectives. China
represents an opportunity for the region to improve
infrastructure, productive capacity, and the formation
of technical cadres, including the development of an
economy more attentive to the environment and improving
connectivity and governance. China was perceived as an
actor that helped improve stability in the region until
the withdrawal of some socialist governments. Aer
the oil price reduction and the change of governments,
China’s image has grown in the persistence of doubts and
reservations of its intentions.
As shown in this research, the inuence of China has
increased in the last two decades due to three crucial
elements. First, the last U.S. executive administrations
played an essential role by deciding to step away from
regional politics. It was understandable to have foreseen
the rise of socialist movements that were guided by the
political and economic models of Cuba and Venezuela.
ese regimes tried to depart from any association with
the U.S. and start new relations with other countries,
especially China, the most rapidly growing power in the
last decades.
Second, the China interest in ensuring the supply of raw
materials. is element is especially evident when China’s
investments were considered. China’s investments can be
divided into three areas: oil, mining, and electricity. e
rst two areas are signicant to assure a growing industry
and a growing China economy.
Finally, China’s political strategy in the region: China has
assured its inuence in the region for, at least, another
decade, given the type of debt contracts that the Latin
American countries signed. Countries such as Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Brazil got
into debts with China with repayments that were agreed
to be done with oil exportations. In some cases, these
repayments were programmed to nish in a 5-10-year
period.
References
1. BBC News. (2 de January de 2019). What’s behind
the China-Taiwan divide? Recuperado el 4 de mayo
de 2020, de https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-34729538
2. Blanchard, J.F. (2019). e Politics of Latin
America’s Investment and Other Links with China:
Contextualizing the Region’s Cash Chasing while
Racking Richer Research Rewards. Journal of
Chinese Political Science, 24(4), 565-582.
3. Cornejo, R. & Navarro, A. (2010). China y América
Latina: recursos, mercados y poder global. Nueva
Sociedad (228), 79-99.
4. Dollar, D. (2019). Understanding China’s Belt and
Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa. Brookings
Institution.
5. Domínguez Martín, R. (2017). La Princesa y el
Dragón: Cooperación China en América Latina
y más allá. Revista Internacional de Cooperación y
Desarrollo, 4(2), 3-27.
6. Gallagher, K. (2016). e China Triangle. Latin
America´s China Boom and the Fate of the
Washington Consensus. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
7. Gallagher, K. & Myers, M. (2020). China-Latin
America Finance Database. Recuperado el 1 de
mayo de 2020, de e Dialogue Leadership for the
Americas: https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/
8. Gil Barragán, J.M. & Aguilera Castillo, A. (2017).
China y América Latina: ¿Socios estratégicos o
competidores? Negocios Internacionales (82), 73-90.
9. Hiratuka, C. (2018). Changes in the Chinese
Development Strategy aer the Global Crisis and
its Impacts in Latin America. Revista de Economía
Contemporánea, 22(1), 1-25.
10. HispanTv. (14 de August de 2017). China advierte
a EEUU contra intervención en Venezuela.
Recuperado el 04 de May de 2020, de https://www.
hispantv.com/noticias/china/350436/venezuela-
eeuu-trump-opcion-militar-injerencia
11. Index Mundi. (2019). Commodity Prices. Obtenido
de https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/
12. Jenkins, R. (2011). El efecto China en los precios
de los productos básicos y en el valor de las
exportaciones de América Latina. Revista de la
CEPAL (103), 77-93.
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
73
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
13. Johnson, K. (2017). e New Middle Kingdom
China and the Early American Romance of Free
Trade. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
14. Lafargue, F. & Lafangue, V. (2017). Objectif
Concours Géographie Économique Cat A et B 2017.
Paris: Hachette Educ.
15. López Villafañe, V. (2016). La emergencia del
China como potencia mundial. Fin del período de
alto crecimiento y nuevos desafíos. Coyuntura y
debate(26), 168-196.
16. Luzuriaga, M. (2017). Inversiones China en
Ecuador: Andes Petroleum y los Bloques 79 y 83.
Quito: Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales.
17. Morrison, W. (2018). China’s economic rise: history,
trends, challenges, and implications for the United
States. Congressional Research Service.
18. NBC News. (2017). ‘America First’: Read Trump’s
Full United Nations Speech. Obtenido de https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/
america-first-read-trump-s-full-united-nations-
speech-n802676
19. Oce of the United States Trade Representative.
(13 de December de 2019). Agreement between the
United States of America, the United Mexican States
and Canada. Obtenido de https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-
mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between
20. Ortíz, S. (october de 2017). Inversión extranjera
directa de China en América Latina y el caribe,
aspectos metodológicos y tendencias durantes 2001-
2016. Economía informa, 406, 4-17.
21. Oviedo, E.D. (2017). Inversiones de China, Corea y
Japón en Argentina. Rosario: UNR Editora.
22. Perroti, D. (2015). La República Popular de
China y América Latina: impacto del crecimiento
económico chino en las exportaciones
latinoamericanas. Revista CEPAL (116), 48-61.
23. Ray, R. & Gallagher, K. (2015). China-Latin America
Economic bulletin 2015 Edition. Global Economic
Governance Iniciative.
24. Remes Lenicov, J., Viola, A. & Knoll, P. (2015). Las
Economía de Brasil y China. Observatorio de la
Economía Mundial (19), 1-16.
25. Ríos, X. (2019). El estado de las relaciones China-
América Latina. Fundación Carolina, Documentos
de trabajo.
26. Rosales, O., Pérez, R., Prado, A. & Bárcena, A.
(2015). América Latina y el Caribe y China. Hacia
una nueva era de cooperación económica. Santiago
de Chile: CEPAL.
27. Sputnik Mundo. (21 de February de 2018). La
corrupción deja pérdidas de $15.000 millones a
Venezuela. Recuperado el 02 de May de 2020,
de https://mundo.sputniknews.com/america-
latina/201802211076478559-caracas-casos-
corruptos/
28. Tamara, G. (14 de February de 2019). Crisis en
Venezuela: qué intereses tiene China en el país
latinoamericano (y por qué tiene tanto que perder).
Recuperado el 04 de May de 2020, de BBC News:
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-
latina-47221713
29. TeleSur. (20 de March de 2020). China reitera
apoyo a Venezuela ante sanciones estadounidenses.
Recuperado el 03 de May de 2020, de Telesurtv.
net: https://www.telesurtv.net/news/china-reitera-
apoyo-venezuela-20200330-0012.html
30. e White House. (2017). National Security
Strategy. Washington.
31. e World Bank. (23 de January de 2020).
Commodity Markets. Recuperado el 01 de May de
2020, de Pink Sheet Data Annual prices: https://
www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-
markets
32. Trading Economics. (2019). Venezuela Public
External Debt. Recuperado el 01 de May de 2020,
de https://tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/
external-debt
33. Vidal Molina, P. (2019). Neoliberalismo,
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
74
Appendixes
Appendix 1. Chinese investments in Venezuela, millions of
USD
Date Type Lender
Amount
(millions of
USD)
2007 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2009 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2009 Mining China Developmnet Bank 1000
2009 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 500
2010 Other CDB and Portugal´s BES 1100
2010 Energy China Developmnet Bank 20300
2011 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2011 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2012 Energy China Developmnet Bank 500
2012 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2013 Energy China Developmnet Bank 4000
2013 Mining China Developmnet Bank 700
2013 Infrastructure China Ex-Im Bank 391
2013 Energy China Developmnet Bank 5000
2014 Infrastructure China Ex-Im Bank 4000
2015 Energy China Developmnet Bank 5000
2016 Energy China Developmnet Bank 2200
Total $62191
Source: Gallagher & Myers, 2020
Appendix 2. Chinese investments in Brazil, millions of USD
Date Type Lender
Amount
(millions of
USD)
2007 Energy China Developmnet Bank 750
2008 Energy China Developmnet Bank 356
2009 Energy China Developmnet Bank 7000
2014 Energy China Developmnet Bank 3000
2015 Energy China Developmnet Bank 1500
2015 Infrastructure China Developmnet Bank 1200
2015 Energy China Developmnet Bankk 3500
2015 Other China Ex-Im Bank 1300
2016 Energy China Developmnet Bank 5000
2017 Other China Ex-Im Bank 300
2017 Energy China Developmnet Bank 5000
Total $28906
Source: Gallagher & Myers, 2020
Appendix 3. Chinese investments in Argentina, millions of
USD
Date Type Lender
Amount
(millions of
USD)
2007 Other China Developmnet Bank 30
2010 Other China Developmnet Bank 30
2010 Infrastructure CDB and others 10000
2010 Infraestructure CDB and CITIC 273
2012 Energy China Developmnet Bank 200
2014 Energy China Developmnet Bank 2500
2014 Infrastructure Belgrano Cargas train line 2100
2014 Other China Ex-Im Bank 162
2017 Other SME development 150
2017 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 331
2018 Infrastructure China Ex-Im Bank 1100
2019 Infraestructure China Developmnet Bank 236
Total $17112
Source: Gallagher & Myers, 2020
Appendix 4. Chinese investments in Ecuador, millions of USD
Date Type Lender
Amount
(millions of
USD)
2010 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 1700
2010 Energy China Developmnet Bank 1000
2010 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 571
2011 Energy China Developmnet Bank 2000
2012 Other China Developmnet Bank 2000
2013 Infraestructure China Ex-Im Bank 80
2013 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 312
2014 Energy China Ex-Im Bank 509
2015 Other China Ex-Im Bank 5300
2015 Other China Developmnet Bank 1500
neodesarrollismo y socialismo bolivariano. Modelos
de desarrollo y políticas públicas en América
Latina. Santiago de Chile: Ariadna Ediciones,
2019. Disponible en http://repositorio.uchile.cl/
handle/2250/159316
34. Vilar, J. R. (November de 2018). Auge y caída del
socialismo del siglo XXI. Revista gobernanza (44).
35. Villavicencio, F. (2013). Ecuador made in China.
Quiro: Interamerican institute for Democracy
Fondo Editorial.
36. Xinhua. (14 de May de 2017). Full text of President
Xi´speech at opening of Belt and Road forum.
Recuperado el 3 de May de 2020, de XinhuaNet:
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-
05/14/c_136282982.htm
37. Xinhua. (24 de November de 2016). Full text of
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the
Caribbean. Recuperado el 02 de May de 2020,
de http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-11/24/
content_39777989.htm
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
FACULTAD DE
CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y
ADMINISTRATIVAS
75
KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS
2015 Other China Ex-Im Bank 250
2016 Other China Ex-Im Bank 198
2016 Other China Developmnet Bank 2000
2018 Other China Developmnet Bank 900
2018 Infraestructure China Ex-Im Bank 69
Total $18389
Source: Gallagher & Myers, 2020
Kairós, Vol. (3) No. 5, pp. 62-75, Julio - Diciembre 2020, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Riobamba-Ecuador - ISSN No. 2631-2743
http://kairos.unach.edu.ec
